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Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a finite population has been investigated in this study.
Traditionally, frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics are modeled by deterministic replicator dynamics under
the assumption that the population size is infinite. However, in reality, population sizes are finite. Recently, stochastic
processes in finite populations have been introduced into evolutionary games in order to study finite size effects in
evolutionary game dynamics. However, most of these studies focus on populations playing only single games. In this
study, we investigate a finite population with two games and show that a finite population playing two games tends to
evolve toward a specific direction to form particular linkages between the strategies of the two games.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Finite population; Stochastic dynamics; Linkage disequilibrium;
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is a fundamental mathematical framework that enables the investigation of evolution
in biological, social, and economic systems, and has been successfully applied to the study of the Darwinian process
of natural selection (Lewontin, 1961; Maynard Smith, 1972; Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1974,
1982; Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Sugden, 1986; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006; Nowak and Sigmund,
2004). The Darwinian process is an inherently frequency-dependent process. The fitness of an individual is not only
linked to environmental conditions but also tightly coupled with the frequencies of its competitors. Replicator dynam-
ics, introduced by Taylor and Jonker (Taylor and Jonker, 1978), is a system of deterministic differential equations,
which model the frequency-dependent selection. It is the most popular model for the evolution of the frequencies of
strategies in a population. However, this model intrinsically assumes that population sizes are infinite and it fails to
consider stochastic effects.
Recently, various frequency-dependent stochastic processes in finite populations have been introduced into evolu-
tionary games in order to study the finite size effect in evolutionary game dynamics (Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al.,
2004; Fudenberg et al., 2006; Szabo´ and To˝ke, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2006; Szabo´ and Hauert, 2002). One such stochas-
tic process is the frequency-dependent Moran process (Nowak et al., 2004). This process is a stochastic birth-death
process and comprises two procedures: (1) birth, in which a player is chosen as a parent to reproduce with a prob-
ability proportional to its fitness, and its offspring has the same strategy as the parent, and (2) death, in which the
offspring replaces a randomly chosen individual. Thus, the population size N is strictly constant in both these proce-
dures. Another process is the local update process (Traulsen et al., 2005). In the local update process, one individual
is chosen randomly, who compares his/her payoff to that of another randomly chosen individual, and the proba-
bility of the former switching to the latter’s strategy is based on difference between their payoffs. Repeating the
process N-times is regarded as the unit time. These models have enabled many analyses of evolutionary processes
and have provided considerable insight into the stochastic effects in evolutionary game dynamics (Nowak et al., 2004;
Taylor et al., 2004; Fudenberg et al., 2006; Traulsen et al., 2005; Ficici and Pollack, 2007; Ohtsuki et al., 2007). How-
ever, most of the previous studies have only focused on a single game with a maximum of two to three strategies. In
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most systems that are of interest to us, we can see that players are playing many games simultaneously, such as bio-
logical games in ecosystems and social games in human societies. Such a situation where players play several games
simultaneously is termed multigame (Hashimoto, 2006). With an infinite population, the multigame effect has been
investigated; when the numbers of strategies of the games are more than two, the fate of the frequencies of the strate-
gies in a single game may change dramatically with or without another game in general (Chamberland and Cressman,
2000; Hashimoto, 2006). Even if one of the games has Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) (Maynard Smith, 1982;
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), the ESS point may be destabilized (Hashimoto, 2006). However, when both games
have two strategies, their fates coincide with the fates of single games (Cressman et al., 2000). However, in a finite
population, the manner in which multigame influence the dynamics remains unclear. In this article, we apply this
motivation to the simplest case.
2. Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games
In this section, we investigate evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a finite population. Let
us consider a population playing two games, game-α and game-β, simultaneously. The reward matrices of the games
are given by
A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
, B =
(
b11 b12
b21 b22
)
,
respectively. The players can be divided into 2 × 2 groups, with group (i, j) comprising players who play strategy-i
for game-α and strategy- j for game-β. We assume that a player’s payoff for game-α and that for game-β additively
influence his/her payoff. A player of strategy-(i, j) playing against a player of strategy-(k, l) will be rewarded aik + b jl.
This player obtains aik through game-α and b jl through game-β. Let xi j denote the frequency of players playing
strategy-(i, j) (∑ xi j = 1). Furthermore, the frequency of players playing strategy-i in game-α is denoted by yi and
that of strategy- j in game-β by z j:
y =
(
y1
y2
)
=
(
x11 + x12
x21 + x22
)
, z =
(
z1
z2
)
=
(
x11 + x21
x12 + x22
)
.
If every individual interacts with a representative sample of the population, the expected payoff for an (i, j)-strategy
player is determined by fi j = ∑k,l aik xkl + b jlxkl and the average payoff of the population is ¯f = ∑ xkl fkl. Using y and
z, these equations can be rewritten as follows:
fi j = (Ay)i + (Bz) j, ¯f = t yAy + t zBz.
In this article, we assume that a coexistence equilibrium point exists in each game. At a coexistence equilibrium
point, all strategies obtain the same payoffs. Let p = t(p, 1− p) and q = t(q, 1− q) denote the coexistence equilibrium
points in game-α and game-β, respectively. p and q are determined by p = a22−a12
a11−a12−a21+a22 and q =
b22−b12
b11−b12−b21+b22 ,
respectively. The existence of the coexistence equilibrium points yields (a11−a21)(a22−a12) > 0 and (b22 −b12)(b11−
b21) > 0. Note that in a multigame situation, system states that satisfy the coexistence equilibria in both the games
are not a single point but rather points on a line determined by y = p and z = q. Here, this line is termed L (see Fig.
2). Furthermore, we assume that the equilibrium points are stable in both the games and their stability are sufficiently
strong. The stability of the equilibrium points ensures
a11 − a21 < 0, a22 − a12 < 0,
b11 − b21 < 0, b22 − b12 < 0.
This means that the two games are Hawk and Dove games which were initially introduced by J. Maynard Smith
(Maynard Smith, 1982).
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2.1. Infinite-population model
In an infinite population, the replicator equation that corresponds to this multigame situation is given by
x˙i j = xi j
(
fi j − ¯f
)
= xi j
{
(Ay)i + (Bz) j − t yAy − t zBz
}
. (1)
Behaviors in this system are rather simple. This differential equation leads
d
dt
x11x22
x12x21
=
x11 x22
x12 x21
( f11 + f22 − f12 − f21) = 0.
Thus, x11 x22
x12 x21
is constant in time evolution and this implies that x11 x22
x12 x21
= (const) forms an invariant manifold. Some
invariant manifolds are shown in Fig. 1. Additionally, in Fig. 2, four orbits that follow Eq. (1) are plotted as
e1
e2
e3
e4
e1
e2
e3
e4
e1
e2
e3
e4
(a) (b) (c)
e1
e2
e3
e4
e1
e2
e3
e4
(d) (e)
Figure 1: Since ∑ xi j = 1 and xi j ≥ 0 hold, a system state can be represented by a point in a tetrahedron. Five
examples of invariant manifolds in the replicator equation are plotted. x11 x22
x12 x21
is (a) 125 , (b) 15 , (c) 1, (d) 5, and (e) 25.
The vertexes represent the system states that all players have the same strategy. e1 represents one of the four vertexes:
(x11, x12, x21, x22) = (1, 0, 0, 0). e2,e3, and e4 represent (0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0), and (0, 0, 0, 1), respectively.
examples. An orbit starting at time t = 0 from a point
(
x11(0) x12(0)
x21(0) x22(0)
)
will move on an invariant manifold determined
by x11 x22
x12 x21
=
x11(0)x22(0)
x12(0)x21(0) and will eventually converge to the intersection point of the invariant manifold and L. Every
point on L is a fixed point and is stable to the transverse direction of L. Furthermore, because every point on L is a
fixed point, the stability to the direction of L is neutral.
2.2. Finite-population model
In a finite population, stochastic effects by the demographic noise constantly perturb the system state. Selection
pressures bring the system state to L, however, stochastic effects prevent the system state from staying on L. In this
study, we are interested in determining the motion of the system state in L’s direction. From a naive intuition, it
may seem to be a simple random walk because the stability in this direction is neutral in a system with an infinite
population. However, we find that finite size effect breaks this neutrality and a flow emerges along L. Consequently,
the system state tends to evolve toward a specific direction of L.
As mentioned above, several processes are proposed for game dynamics in finite populations. In this article, we
concentrate on the local updating process proposed by Traulsen et al. (Traulsen et al., 2005). In the local update
process, a player b is chosen randomly and his/her payoff is compared to that of another randomly chosen individual
a. The probability of player-b switching his/her strategy to the player-a’s strategy is given by
γ( f(a), f(b)) = 12 +
ω
2
( f(a) − f(b)),
3
Figure 2: A set of coexistence equilibrium points in this system forms a line indicated by L. Four orbits in a deter-
ministic system with an infinite population are plotted. All of these orbits start from points on an identical invariant
manifold, which is represented by a curved surface. They move on the manifold and converge to the intersection point
of L and the manifold.
where f(a) and f(b) are the payoffs of player-a and player-b, respectively. Furthermore, ω(≥ 0) measures the strength
of the selection pressure. Selection is weak when ω ≪ 1, the process is dominated by random updating and payoff
differences have a negligible effect on the process. For larger ω, the selection intensity increases. However, an upper
limit is imposed on ω by the following requirement: 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The probability of selecting an (i, j)-strategy player
as player-a is xi j and the probability of selecting a (k, l)-strategy player as player-b is xkl. Therefore, the probability,
P(i, j)(k,l), that the number of (i, j)-strategy players increases by one and that of (k, l)-strategy players decreases by one in
a single process is given by
P(i, j)(k,l) = xi jxklγ( fi j, fkl) = xi jxkl
{
1
2
+
ω
2
( fi j − fkl)
}
. (2)
The probability that the system state does not change is 1 −
∑
(i, j),(k,l)
P(i, j)(k,l).
It is noteworthy that in the limit of N → ∞, this process represents a replicator equation. The expected change of
xi j in a single process is as follows:
〈
∆xi j
〉
=
1
N
∑
(k,l)
P(i, j)(k,l) − P
(k,l)
(i, j) =
ω
N
xi j
(
fi j − ¯f
)
.
Because the process is iterated N times in a unit time, a single process takes time ∆t = 1N . In the limit of N → ∞, the
replicator equation is derived as
x˙i j = lim
N→∞
∆xi j
∆t
= ωxi j
(
fi j − ¯f
)
.
Therefore, the stochastic process indeed implements a replicator equation in a finite population with stochasticity of
demographic noise.
In the process, the system state ultimately reaches one of the four homogeneous states (i.e., the states that all play-
ers have the same strategy) after long transient, and these four states correspond to the four vertexes of the tetrahedron.
However, the time taken to reach such a homogeneous state is extremely long, especially in a large population, be-
cause of the stability of coexistence equilibrium points (Antal and Scheuring, 2006). In contrast, extinction of a single
strategy resulting from a random walk along L occurs in a short time-scale. Similar to the infinite-population case,
first, the system state is immediately brought to the vicinity of L from its initial point by the selection pressure roughly
along the manifold that the initial state is located. Subsequently, the system state fluctuates around L because of the
stochastic effects. Eventually, one of the strategies become extinct, implying that the system state has reached one of
the boundaries of L. Strictly speaking, this is inaccurate. In fact, the system state reaches a point on a boundary plane
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when a single strategy is extinct and this location is not necessarily a boundary of L but a point close to it. Following
this, the system state fluctuates on the boundary plane around the intersection point of L and the boundary plane. In
Fig. 3, an evolutionary path from an initial state to a state in which a single strategy is eliminated is plotted. Finally,
Figure 3: A trajectory in a stochastic system with a finite population is plotted. The system state is brought to L due to
the selection pressure in the same way as the infinite-population model. However, in contrast to the case of an infinite
population, stochastic effects prevent the system state from staying on L, and it fluctuates around L. Eventually, the
system state reaches one of the boundaries of L.
in the limit of time evolution, two strategies will be eliminated, that is, the population becomes homogeneous. This
is the absorbing state of the system and it takes an enormously long time because of the stability of the coexistence
equilibrium. Therefore, the boundaries of L can be considered as absorbing states for a short time-scale evolution.
As mentioned above, we are not interested in determining how the homogeneous states are reached but rather how
the boundaries of L are reached. This rather literary illustration of the system behavior raises following questions:
Is the movement of the system state along L just a simple random walk? If not, which absorbing state has a higher
likelihood of being observed? This article is aimed to answer these questions.
2.3. Variable transformation
To investigate the behavior of the system we here adopt a variable transformation
(
x11 x12
x21 x22
)
7→ (r, u, v):
(
x11 x12
x21 x22
)
=
(
pq p(1 − q)
(1 − p)q (1 − p)(1 − q)
)
+
r
2
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
+
u
2
(
1 1
−1 −1
)
+
v
2
(
1 −1
1 −1
)
. (3)
Note that the origin of (r, u, v)-coordinate depends on p and q. Since Eq. (3) leads y = p+ u
(
1
−1
)
and z = q + v
(
1
−1
)
,
u and v represents the deviations from equilibria in game-α and game-β, respectively. L is represented by u = v = 0.
Therefore, r-axis is identical to L. A sample trajectory in (r, u, v)-coordinate is plotted in Fig. 4. A Markov process on
(r, u, v)-space is led from the transition probabilities (Eq. (2)) and this variable transformation. For an example, with
a probability of P(1,1)(1,2), a (1, 2)-strategy player is replaced by (1, 1)-strategy player, then r and v increase by 1/N and u
remains unchanged. Another example, a (2, 2)-strategy player is replaced by (1, 1)-strategy player with a probability
of P(1,1)(2,2), then u and v increase by 1/N and r remains unchanged.
2.4. Langevin equations
To analyze the dynamics of a large but finite population, it is effective to approximate the dynamics using Langevin
equations (Helbing, 1996; Traulsen et al., 2005, 2006, 2012). The objective of this study is to determine the time
evolution of r; the first step to this is to derive the Langevin equations for (r, u, v) by approximating the Markov
process, assuming that the population size N is sufficiently large.
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Figure 4: A sample trajectory in (r, u, v)-coordinate. r-axis is identical to the line L indicated in Fig. 3. The trajectory
makes its way toward the r-axis and subsequently fluctuates around it. Eventually, it reaches one of the boundaries of
L.
The expected changes of r, u and v in a single process are respectively given as
〈∆r〉 = 1
N
gr(r, u, v) = 1N
∑
i
k,l
P(i,i)(k,l) − P
(k,l)
(i,i) ,
〈∆u〉 = 1
N
gu(r, u, v) = 1N
∑
k,l
P(1,k)(2,l) − P
(2,l)
(1,k),
〈∆v〉 = 1
N
gv(r, u, v) = 1N
∑
k,l
P(k,1)(l,2) − P
(l,2)
(k,1).
These are used for the drift terms in the Langevin equations. Based on a simple calculation using Eq. (2) and the
variable transformation Eq. (3), gr, gu, and gv are given by
gr(r, u, v) = ω
[
Φu
{
−p(1 − p)(1 − 2p) − ru + r
2
(1 − 2p) − u
2
(1 − 2p)(1 − 2q) + v
2
}
+ Ψv
{
−q(1 − q)(1 − 2q) − rv + r
2
(1 − 2q) − v
2
(1 − 2p)(1 − 2q) + u
2
}]
(4)
gu(r, u, v) = ω
[
Φu(p + u)(1 − p − u) + Ψv
{
r
2
− uv + u
2
(1 − 2q) + v
2
(1 − 2p)
}]
(5)
gv(r, u, v) = ω
[
Ψv(q + v)(1 − q − v) + Φu
{
r
2
− uv + u
2
(1 − 2q) + v
2
(1 − 2p)
}]
(6)
respectively, where Φ = a11 + a22 − a12 − a21, Ψ = b11 + b22 − b12 − b21. Note that the stability of the equilibrium
points in the two games yields Φ < 0, Ψ < 0. Moreover,
〈
(∆r)2
〉
,
〈
(∆u)2
〉
,
〈
(∆v)2
〉
, 〈∆r∆u〉, 〈∆r∆v〉, 〈∆u∆v〉 are also
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respectively given as
〈
(∆r)2
〉
=
1
N2
hrr(r, u, v) = 1N2
∑
i
k,l
P(i,i)(k,l) + P
(k,l)
(i,i) ,
〈
(∆u)2
〉
=
1
N2
huu(r, u, v) = 1N2
∑
k,l
P(1,k)(2,l) + P
(2,l)
(1,k),
〈
(∆v)2
〉
=
1
N2
hvv(r, u, v) = 1N2
∑
k,l
P(k,1)(l,2) + P
(l,2)
(k,1),
〈∆r∆u〉 = 1
N2
hru(r, u, v) = 1N2
∑
k,l
P(k,1)(l,1) − P
(k,2)
(l,2) ,
〈∆r∆v〉 = 1
N2
hrv(r, u, v) = 1N2
∑
k,l
P(1,k)(1,l) − P
(2,k)
(2,l) ,
〈∆u∆v〉 = 1
N2
huv(r, u, v) = 1N2
∑
k,l
P(k,k)(l,l) − P
(l,k)
(k,l).
These are used for the diffusion terms in the Langevin equations. Remember that the process is repeated N times in a
unit time. Assuming that N is sufficiently large, the central limit theorem yields the Langevin equations as follows:
r˙ = gr(r, u, v) + 1√
N
ζr(t), (7)
u˙ = gu(r, u, v) + 1√
N
ζu(t), (8)
v˙ = gv(r, u, v) + 1√
N
ζv(t).. (9)
Here, ζr(t), ζu(t) and ζv(t) denote Gaussian white noise with
〈ζr(t)〉 = 〈ζu(t)〉 = 〈ζv(t)〉 = 0,〈
ζr(t)ζr(t′)〉 = (hrr − g2r ) δ(t − t′),〈
ζu(t)ζu(t′)〉 = (huu − g2u) δ(t − t′),〈
ζv(t)ζv(t′)〉 = (hvv − g2v) δ(t − t′),〈
ζr(t)ζu(t′)〉 = (hru − grgu) δ(t − t′),〈
ζr(t)ζv(t′)〉 = (hrv − grgv) δ(t − t′),〈
ζu(t)ζv(t′)〉 = (huv − gugv) δ(t − t′).
These noises are demographic stochasticity and should be interpreted in Ito’s sense. Assuming that the system size
N is sufficiently large leads that the deviations of u and v are sufficiently small. Under this assumption, we disregard
the effects of the deviations of u and v on the noise terms. For an example, 〈ζr(t)ζr(t)〉 = hrr(r, u, v) − g2r (r, u, v) can be
approximated by hrr(r, 0, 0) − g2r (r, 0, 0). The other correlations of the noise terms can be approximated in the same
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manner. A simple calculation yields the following equations:
hrr − g2r ≈ hrr(r, 0, 0) − g2r (r, 0, 0)
= {pq + (1 − p)(1 − q) + r} {p(1 − q) + (1 − p)q − r} (10)
huu − g2u ≈ huu(r, 0, 0) − g2u(r, 0, 0) = p(1 − p) (11)
hvv − g2v ≈ hvv(r, 0, 0) − g2v(r, 0, 0) = q(1 − q) (12)
huv − gugv ≈ huv(r, 0, 0) − gu(r, 0, 0)gv(r, 0, 0) = r2 (13)
hru − grgu ≈ hru(r, 0, 0) − gr(r, 0, 0)gu(r, 0, 0) = −(1 − 2p)q(1 − q) (14)
hrv − grgv ≈ hrv(r, 0, 0) − gr(r, 0, 0)gv(r, 0, 0) = −(1 − 2q)p(1 − p) (15)
Thus, the correlations of noise ζu and ζv are approximated by
〈
ζu(t)ζu(t′)〉 = p(1 − p)δ(t − t′),〈
ζv(t)ζv(t′)〉 = q(1 − q)δ(t − t′),〈
ζu(t)ζv(t′)〉 = r2δ(t − t′),
respectively. This approximation and linearizing Eqs. (8) and (9) yield
(
u˙
v˙
)
= J
(
u
v
)
+
1√
N
(
ζu(t)
ζv(t)
)
(16)
where J is the Jacobi matrix of Eqs. (8) and (9) at (u, v) = (0, 0):
J =
( ∂gu
∂u
∂gu
∂v
∂gv
∂u
∂gv
∂v
)
= ω
(
Φp(1 − p) Ψ r2
Φ r2 Ψq(1 − q)
)
.
Because N is sufficiently large, we can assume that the motion of r is rather slow and the time taken to reach one of
the boundaries of L is sufficiently long. Thus, the asymptotic solution of the linear Langevin equation Eq. (16) is
given as
(
u(t)
v(t)
)
=
1√
N
∫ t
−∞
eJ(t−s)
(
ξu(s)
ξv(s)
)
ds. (17)
Based on a simple algebra, it is shown that u and v obey the two-dimensional normal distribution with zero mean:
1
2pi
√|Γ| exp
[
−12(u, v)Γ
−1
(
u
v
)]
where Γ is the covariance matrix of u and v:
Γ =
〈(
u2 uv
uv v2
)〉
= − 1
2Nω
( 1
Φ
0
0 1
Ψ
)
. (18)
For the next step, we approximate gr(r, u, v) by 〈gr(r, u, v)〉u,v in order to exclude u and v from the Langevin
equation of r (Eq. (7)). By using Eq. (18), we obtain
〈gr(r, u, v)〉u,v =
1
N
{
r +
1
2
(1 − 2p)(1 − 2q)
}
.
Finally, Eq. (7) can be approximated by
〈r˙〉u,v =
1
N
{
r +
1
2
(1 − 2p)(1 − 2q)
}
+
1√
N
ζr(t) (19)
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where ζr(t) denotes Gaussian white noise with
〈ζr(t)〉 = 0,〈
ζr(t)ζr(t′)〉 = {pq + (1 − p)(1 − q) + r} {p(1 − q) + (1 − p)q − r} δ(t − t′).
In contrast to the case of an infinite population, Eq. (19) indicates that the neutrality on L vanishes and the motion
of r is not a simple random walk. The drift term of Eq. (19) is positive (negative) when r is larger (smaller) than
r∗ = − 12 (1−2p)(1−2q). Thus, the equilibrium point r∗ is unstable in Eq. (19) (see Fig. 5). The order of the drift term
is O(1/N), whereas that of the diffusion term is O(1/√N). Therefore, the flow by the drift term is obscured by the
diffusion when the population size is large. However, if the population size is not large, distinct trends of behaviors
can be observed as demonstrated by the numerical simulations in Section 3.
Figure 5: A schematic view of the drift term of Eq. (19).
Note that from Eq. (4), it is obvious that 〈∆r〉 is always zero when (u, v) = (0, 0) (i.e., the system state is precisely
on L) regardless of the value of r. Therefore, when the system state is precisely on L, the expected motion of r is
neutral. However, constantly occurring perturbation by finite size effect causes
〈
u2
〉
and
〈
v2
〉
to be non-zero, making
flow presented in Fig. 5 in the expected motion of r. In this manner, emergence of such flow is a somewhat indirect
effect of finiteness of the system size.
2.5. Strategy linkage between the two games
On L, r measures the linkage between the strategies of the two games. xi j = yiz j holds if r = 0, that is, there is no
linkage between the strategies of the two games. When r is positively larger, a player playing strategy-1 (strategy-2)
in game-α also plays strategy-1 (strategy-2) in game-β with a higher probability and vice versa. In such a case, the
strategies of the two games are positively linked in the population. On the other hand, when r is negatively larger, a
player playing strategy-1 (strategy-2) in game-α plays strategy-2 (strategy-1) in game-β with higher probability and
vice versa; in such a case, the strategies of the two games are negatively linked. Because the labels of the strategies
can be assigned arbitrarily, we can assume that p, q ≤ 12 without the loss of generality. This assumption means that in
each game, the minor strategy at the equilibrium point is labeled strategy-1 and the major one is labeled strategy-2.
Here, we show that the system state tends to have positive linkage under this condition. We can also assume that
p ≤ q. Even if p > q, game-α and game-β just need to be relabeled to satisfy this assumption. These assumptions
yield the following equations: pq ≤ p(1 − q) ≤ (1 − p)q ≤ (1 − p)(1 − q). Therefore, non-negativity of xi j indicates
that the boundaries of L are
(
0 p
q 1 − p − q
)
and
(
p 0
q − p 1 − q
)
. Thus, the range of r is given by
rL ≤ r ≤ rH ,
(
rL = −2pq, rH = 2p(1 − q)
)
.
Since p, q ≤ 12 , r∗ is always non-positive and the midpoint of L is always non-negative (i.e., r∗ ≤ 0 ≤
(
rL + rH
)
/2 =
p(1 − 2q)). Thus, the position of r∗ on L can typically be depicted as Fig. 6(a). Furthermore, if p + q < 12 is satisfied,
r∗ is lesser than rL and in such a case, the drift term in Eq. (19) is always set to be positive regardless of the value of r,
as presented in Fig. 6(b). Such an obvious asymmetry of flow introduces a particular trend in the system. If the initial
state is chosen randomly, it is clear that the system state goes to the higher boundary of L with a higher probability
than the lower boundary. The population tends to have minor-minor and major-major linkages between the strategies
of the two games.
Additionally, let us consider the rare mutation of strategies. Mutation restores extinct strategies and makes the
system ergodic. Therefore, the system state can be observed to making round trips along L repeatedly. Obviously,
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Figure 6: Schematic views of the drift term in Eq. (19). Since p, q ≤ 12 , r∗ ≤ 0 ≤ r
L+rH
2 is always satisfied. (a) When
p + q ≥ 12 , r∗ is between rL and r = 0. (b) Otherwise, r∗ is under rL.
states around
(
p 0
q − p 1 − q
)
are observed more often than
(
0 p
q 1 − p − q
)
. This indicates that the population with
positive linkage is observed more often than that with negative linkage. Although it is difficult to analytically derive
the frequencies of the periods to stay around the lower and higher boundaries, we will confirm this bias with a
numerical simulation in Section 3.
3. Numerical simulations
Here, we demonstrate the tendency of the motion of r with several numerical simulations.
3.1. Round trips along L
To confirm the discussion in the last of the previous section, let us introduce mutation into the system. In each
iteration of the process, a randomly chosen individual replaces his/her strategy with another strategy with a certain
small probability µ. Since mutation makes the system ergodic, the system state shows round trips along L repeatedly.
Therefore, we can observe the tendency of the motion. In Fig. (7), the time series of r in several population sizes are
plotted. r fluctuates around rH and rL and move back and forth between them repeatedly. We can clearly observe that
r takes more time to fluctuate around rH than around rL in all plots. As Eq. (19) suggests, this trend is observed more
distinctly in a smaller population.
3.2. Direction of flow at (r, u, v) = (0, 0, 0)
Second, we calculate the expected values of r at t = 18 starting from (r, u, v) = (0, 0, 0) at t = 0 for a set of various
(p, q). Eq. (19) indicates that if both of p and q are larger or smaller than 12 , 〈r(t)〉 is positive, otherwise, 〈r(t)〉 is
negative. A probability distribution, the initial distribution of which is concentrated on (r, u, v) = (0, 0, 0), is updated
N × 18 times with transition probabilities given by Eq. (2); subsequently, 〈r(t = 1/8)〉 is evaluated with the distribution
at t = 18 and plotted in Fig. 8. As expected from Eq. (19), Fig. 8 shows that when p and q are both larger or smaller
than 12 , 〈r〉 is positive; otherwise, 〈r〉 is negative.
To justify the framework of our analysis, let us compare the values obtained by the numerical simulations with
analytically approximated values. Since the period from t = 0 to t = 18 is too short to use Eq. (19) as it is without any
modifications, we here derive the approximated value of 〈r(t = 1/8)〉 with the condition (r(0), u(0), v(0)) = (0, 0, 0).
Since this initial state is a fixed point, diffusional effect dominates the dynamics when t is small. Thus, the mean
values of u2(t), v2(t), and u(t)v(t) for t ≪ 1 are simply obtained from Eqs. (11)-(13):
〈(
u2(t) u(t)v(t)
u(t)v(t) v2(t)
)〉
=
1
N
(
p(1 − p) 0
0 q(1 − q)
)
t + O(t2). (20)
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Additionally, the mean values of r(t)u(t) and r(t)v(t) for t ≪ 1 are also obtained from Eqs. (14) and (15):
〈(
r(t)u(t)
r(t)v(t)
)〉
= − 1
N
(
p(1 − p)(1 − 2q)
(1 − 2p)q(1 − q)
)
t + O(t2). (21)
From Eqs. (20), (21), and (4), r˙ for t ≪ 1 can be approximated by
r˙ = −ωt
N
{Φp(1 − p) + Ψq(1 − q)} (1 − 2p)(1 − 2q) + O(t2) + 1√
N
ζr(t). (22)
〈r(t)〉 can be approximated by integrating Eq. (22) as follows:
〈r(t)〉 = −ωt
2
2N
{Φp(1 − p) + Ψq(1 − q)} (1 − 2p)(1 − 2q) + O(t3). (23)
Fig. 8 shows the approximation values calculated by Eq. (23). This figure clearly indicates that the values obtained
by the numerical simulations are approximated effectively by Eq. (23).
4. Conclusion
In this article, we investigate a finite population with two games and show that a finite population playing two
games tends to evolve toward a specific direction to form certain linkages between the strategies of the two games.
We found that although the two games are not related, a population tends to form a linkage between the minor (major)
strategies of the two games.
From the population genetics perspective, this means that two loci, which determine an individual’s traits that
independently contribute to its fitness, may have a stronger tendency to form a particular linkage disequilibrium in
smaller populations. In future studies, more complicated situations, such as games that have three or more strategies,
populations that play three or more games, and diploid cases, could be investigated.
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Figure 7: Time series of r in the system with mutation are plotted. The payoff matrices of the games are set A =(
0 0.2
0.8 0
)
and B =
(
0 0.3
0.7 0
)
. Thus, p = 0.2 and q = 0.3. Moreover, the selection intensity is ω = 0.5 and mutation rate
is µ = 5 × 10−5. The number of individuals is 500, 1, 000 and 2, 000 in (a), (b), and (c), respectively. The initial states
are all set at
( x11 x12
x21 x22
)
=
( pq p(1−q)
(1−p)q (1−p)(1−q)
)
. The dashed lines represent rH(= 0.28) and rL(= −0.12). The upper one is rH
and the other is rL.
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pq
×10
−7
〈r(1/8)〉
×10
−7
Figure 8: The number of players is N = 322 = 1024. The expected values of r at t = 18 , which start from (r, u, v) =
(0, 0, 0) at t = 0, are plotted for various (p, q). (p, q) is set at (p, q) =
(
P
32 ,
Q
32
)
, (P = 1, . . . , 31, Q = 1, . . . , 31).
The payoff matrices are given by A =
( 0 p
1−p 0
)
and B =
( 0 q
1−q 0
)
here. The initial state
(
N11 N12
N21 N22
)
(Ni j is the number of
(i, j)-strategy players) corresponding to (r, u, v) = (0, 0, 0) is
(
PQ P(32−Q)
(32−P) (32−P)(32−Q)
)
. The colored surface represents the
results of the numerical simulation and the red lines are plotted by Eq. (23). Numerical simulation has been conducted
as follows: initially, a probability distribution on the system states that concentrated on
(
PQ P(32−Q)
(32−P) (32−P)(32−Q)
)
is prepared
and updated 128
(
= N × 18
)
times with the transition probabilities given in Eq. (2); subsequently, 〈r(t = 1/8)〉 is
evaluated with the distribution at t = 18 .
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